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Accurately and efficiently perceiving social cues such as body movements and facial
expressions is important in social interaction. Accurate social perception of this kind
does not solely rely on “bottom-up” visual processing but is also subject to modulation
by “top-down” signals. For example, if instructed to look for signs of happiness rather
than fear, participants are more likely to categorize facial expressions as happy—this prior
expectation biases subsequent perception. Top-down modulation is also important in our
reactions to others. For example, top-down control over imitation plays an important role
in the development of smooth and harmonious social interactions. This paper highlights
the importance of top-down modulation in our perception of, and reactions to, others. We
discuss evidence that top-down modulation of social perception and imitation is atypical
in Autism Spectrum Conditions and in schizophrenia, and we consider the effect this may
have on the development of social interactions for individuals with these developmental
disorders.
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TOP-DOWN MODULATION IS IMPORTANT
IN SOCIAL INTERACTION
It is important for social interaction that individuals have effi-
cient and accurate mechanisms for social perception. Accurate
social perception depends on a number of processes including
“bottom-up” sensory processing and “top-down” modulation,
which prioritizes the stimuli that are most relevant to our current
activities and goals. This paper focuses on top-down processes
involved in perception of and reactions to social stimuli.
Top-down control involves multiple processes, including most
notably attention and expectation. For example, if asked to direct
your attention to a particular face that is hidden amongst a crowd
of faces, you would be more efficient at detecting its characteris-
tics compared to those of the other faces in the crowd. We are also
able to make predictions about the nature of an incoming stimu-
lus based on our prior expectations. Suppose that you are at a pub
with some friends; the general ambiance is warm and happy, you
expect your peers to show positive facial expressions. However,
you might anticipate encountering different facial expressions in
another context; for instance, one is more likely to observe expres-
sions of sorrow at a funeral. Contradictions of our expectations
in either case will surprise us. In contrast, the ability to anticipate
others’ emotions facilitates our behavioral response to the sen-
sory world by promoting efficient sensory processing of stimuli
that are congruent with expectations.
Recent theoretical (Summerfield and Egner, 2009) and
computational (Wyart et al., 2012) models of visual processing
dissociate attention and expectation. Whereas expectation facil-
itates visual perception by increasing the prior likelihood that
a subset of visual information will occur, attention reduces the
computational burden by prioritizing processing of a particular
subset of visual information on the basis of its behavioral signif-
icance (Summerfield and Egner, 2009). Recent explanations have
described the difference between attention and expectation in the
context of signal-to-noise detection where enhanced signal-to-
noise precision can be a result of increased signal or reduced noise
(Wyart et al., 2012). Cues predicting the relevant location (atten-
tional cues) of a to-be-detected signal primarily increase signal-
to-noise precision by suppressing noise; whereas, cues predicting
greater signal probability (expectation cues) increase precision by
elevating signal (Wyart et al., 2012).
The top-down effects of attention and expectation do not
operate only at the level of perception but can also modulate our
actions. One example of this is the modulation of imitation by
social context. Individuals imitate more when in a positive social
context (Lakin and Chartrand, 2003) and simple social ostensive
cues such as direct eye-gaze affect automatic imitation mecha-
nisms: individuals are faster to perform actions that match, rather
than deviate from, observed actions (Wang et al., 2011a).
Even pro-social, compared to non-social, priming that is sub-
liminal results in significantly higher levels of automatic imitation
(Leighton et al., 2010; Cook and Bird, 2011a,b). For example,
Leighton et al. (2010) asked participants to rearrange five words
such that they formed a grammatically correct sentence; these
sentences either comprised positive social words (e.g., friend,
team, assist) or anti-social words (e.g., rebel, obstinate, distrust).
Despite reporting no awareness of the underlying theme, indi-
viduals who had rearranged the positive social words exhibited
higher levels of automatic imitation than individuals who had
rearranged the anti-social words. Such facilitation of imitation
according to social context is likely a key component in the devel-
opment of smooth and harmonious social interactions: being
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imitated increases rapport (Chartrand and Bargh, 1999), altru-
istic behavior (van Baaren et al., 2004) and trust (Bailenson and
Yee, 2005).
NEURAL MECHANISMS OF TOP-DOWN MODULATION
OF SOCIAL PERCEPTION
In recent years a number of studies have investigated the neural
mechanisms that underpin the top-down modulation of social
perception.
ATTENTION
The modulatory effects of attention are thought to proceed via
feedback connections from frontal and parietal regions includ-
ing the superior parietal lobule, intraparietal sulcus, frontal eye
fields, and supplementary eye fields (Corbetta et al., 1993; Fink
et al., 1997) to sensory processing areas (Cavada and Goldman-
Rakic, 1989; Ungerleider et al., 1989; see Figure 5 for example
relating to auditory sensory processing). Such feedback con-
nections are thought to play a role in amplifying activity in
stimulus-specific neural regions (Kastner and Ungerleider, 2001;
Pessoa et al., 2002). For instance, activity in motion specific visual
cortex, and connectivity between early visual cortex (V2) and
visual motion processing areas (hMT/V5), was enhanced when
attending to visual motion compared to when not attending
(Büchel et al., 1998). This enhanced connectivity was modulated
by top-down signals from parietal and prefrontal cortex.
This explanatory framework, which states that top-down sig-
nals from parietal and frontal areas enhance stimulus processing
in stimulus-specific cortex, extends to the processing of social
stimuli. Attention to faces (compared with attention to a location
that does not feature faces) is associated with increased activity in
the fusiform face area (FFA; Vuilleumier et al., 2001; Bird et al.,
2006) and the amygdala (Pessoa et al., 2002). Attention to faces is
also associated with increased FFA to V1 connectivity (Bird et al.,
2006).
EXPECTATION
Top-down signals relating to prior expectations, from frontal and
parietal regions, enhance processing in stimulus-specific cor-
tex. For instance, Summerfield et al. (2006) showed participants
images of faces, houses, and cars. In each block participants were
required to press a specific “target” button upon perceiving a par-
ticular stimulus type (e.g., face) and to press the “non-target”
button for all other stimuli (e.g., cars and houses). It has previ-
ously been demonstrated that, in contrast to instructions such as
“is the stimulus A (e.g., a face) or B (e.g., a car)?” instructions
of the form “is the stimulus A or not?” involve the activation
of a prior expectation (also referred to as an internal template;
(Dayan et al., 1995; Dosher and Lu, 1999) against which all stim-
uli are compared (Summerfield and Koechlin, 2008). On each
trial the participant therefore has a prior expectation for one
stimulus type over the alternatives. In the paradigm employed
by Summerfield and colleagues the prior expectation (that is,
the stimulus-type to be detected) changed on a block-by-block
basis. Analyses revealed enhanced activity in the ventro-medial
prefrontal cortex (vMPFC) when the prior expectations matched
the incoming sensory data (Summerfield and Koechlin, 2008).
Furthermore, connectivity analyses suggested a top-down influ-
ence of frontal cortex activity on face-responsive regions in the
fusiform gyrus and the amygdala (Summerfield et al., 2006).
Previous studies have suggested that vmPFC plays a role in con-
firming and reinforcing the validity of prior expectations (Daw
et al., 2006; Hampton et al., 2006).
We recently investigated the influence of prior expectations
on emotional facial expression discrimination. Prior expecta-
tions were first set by instructing participants to look out for
faces with a particular “target” expression (fear, anger or hap-
piness). Subsequently participants viewed a sequence of faces
and responded with one button for the target expression and
a different button for all other facial expressions. Detection
responses were faster and more accurate for faces that matched
prior expectations relative to non-matching faces. Furthermore,
neuroimaging data showed that congruency, compared to incon-
gruency, between prior expectation and incoming sensory data
was associated with vmPFC activity (Barbalat et al., 2012a). In
addition, there was greater functional connectivity between the
vmPFC and the thalamus when an incoming angry face stim-
ulus was congruent with the instruction, compared to when it
was incongruent. The thalamus acts as an intermediary between
the retina and emotion-processing areas (such as the amygdala)
enabling rapid and preconscious processing of potentially threat-
ening stimuli (Pessoa and Adolphs, 2010). Therefore it may be
that when an individual is faced with a stimulus that matches
prior expectation the vmPFC facilitates emotional responsiveness
via top-down control of the thalamus.
TOP-DOWN INFLUENCES ON ACTION OBSERVATION
AND IMITATION
In addition to their role in amplifying processing in stimulus-
specific cortex, top-down signals may also modulate activity in
action-related areas such as the mirror neuron system (MNS).
Mirror neurons fire during both execution of an action and obser-
vation of that same action (di Pellegrino et al., 1992; Kraskov
et al., 2009). Areas of the human brain with these response prop-
erties have been called the MNS (Iacoboni, 2009) and it has been
suggested that the MNS comprises the neural correlate of imita-
tion (Iacoboni, 2005, 2009). This hypothesis has been supported
by findings that MNS areas are active during the imitation of
actions (Iacoboni et al., 1999) and applying repetitive transcra-
nial magnetic stimulation to disrupt activity in MNS areas results
in reduced automatic imitation (Catmur et al., 2009) and higher
error rates for effortful imitation (Heiser et al., 2003).
Although the MNS may automatically respond to observed
actions, and likely supports imitation, we do not imitate every
action we observe. Recent studies suggest that top-down signals
from other, non-MNS, brain regions modulate MNS regions and
hence control imitative responses. Following from observations
that individuals with medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) lesions
exhibit heightened levels of imitation (Lhermitte, 1986; Brass
et al., 2003), Brass and colleagues have used functional magnetic
resonance imaging (fMRI) to show that inhibition, compared to
execution, of imitative responses elicits activity in key nodes in
the “social brain” network: the mPFC and temporo-parietal junc-
tion (TPJ) (Brass et al., 2001, 2003, 2005; Spengler et al., 2009,
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2010b). This association between control of imitation and social
brain activity has been further supported in a series of studies
by Hamilton and colleagues: direct eye contact increases auto-
matic imitation of hand movements (Wang et al., 2011a); and this
effect appears to be driven by the modulatory influence of mPFC
activity on activity in action perception areas [posterior superior
temporal sulcus (pSTS)], which subsequently influences activity
in a key MNS region [inferior frontal gyrus (IFG)] (Wang et al.,
2011b).
ATYPICAL TOP-DOWN MODULATION IN AUTISM
SPECTRUM CONDITIONS
Autism spectrum conditions (ASC) are pervasive developmen-
tal disorders, characterized by a triad of impairments: verbal and
non-verbal communication problems, difficulties with reciprocal
social interactions, and unusual patterns of repetitive behavior
(American Psychiatric Association, 1994). An accumulating body
of evidence suggests atypical top-down modulation of early sen-
sory processing in individuals with ASC (Frith, 2003). Bird et al.
(2006) used fMRI to record brain activity from high function-
ing participants with ASC, and control participants, during the
attentional modulation of face processing. Four images (two face
images and two house images) were presented on each trial;
images were arranged in a diamond shape with images from the
same category in the same dimension (as in Figure 1). Before each
trial, attention was directed to either the vertical or horizontal
dimension; therefore, on each trial participants attended either to
faces or to houses. For control participants, attention modulated
activity in the FFA such that FFA activity was high when faces were
attended and low when faces were not attended. Individuals with
ASC did not demonstrate this same effect: FFA activity did not
discriminate trials in which the face was and was not attended.
Thus, this study demonstrated reduced attentional modulation of
face processing in adults with ASC.
In addition to atypical effects of attention in ASC previous
studies have demonstrated reduced effects of prior knowledge.
For instance, for typical controls, viewing images of faces can
improve subsequent identification of degraded versions of these
faces; this effect is reduced in ASC (Loth et al., 2010). Similarly,
Dichter and Belger (2008) demonstrated a lack of arousal medi-
ated top-down modulation in ASC. Specifically they reported
that when stimuli demanding cognitive control were preceded by
highly arousing pictures, activation in the right middle frontal
gyrus was elevated for control participants, compared to when
stimuli were preceded by pictures that were low in arousal. In con-
trast, for individuals with ASC highly arousing pictures did not
modulate right middle frontal gyrus activity, suggesting a lack of
top-down modulation.
As discussed above, social actions such as imitation can be
modulated by primed concepts. We recently demonstrated that
the social modulation of imitation is diminished in individu-
als with ASC (Cook and Bird, 2011a). This study employed an
adapted version of the paradigm used by Leighton et al. (2010)
in which participants first completed a pro- or non-social prim-
ing task before completing a measure of automatic imitation.
Whereas control participants primed with pro-social attitudes
imitated significantly more than those primed with non-social
FIGURE 1 | Stimuli employed by Bird et al. (2006). Four images (two face
images and two house images) were presented on each trial; images were
arranged in a diamond shape with images from the same category (faces or
houses) in the same dimension. For instance here faces are presented in
the vertical dimension and houses in the horizontal dimension. Figure is
reproduced, with permission, from Bird et al. (2006).
attitudes, this modulation of imitation was not seen for individu-
als with ASC. Participants with ASC primed with pro-social atti-
tudes imitated to the same extent as those primed with non-social
attitudes (Figure 2).
NEURAL BASIS OF ATYPICAL TOP-DOWN MODULATION IN ASC
Top-down modulation refers to the effects of signals from “con-
trol” regions, such as the PFC, on sensory processing. According
to this definition there are at least three possible causes of atypi-
cal top-down modulation: atypical function of sensory regions;
atypical function of control regions; and atypical connectivity
between control and sensory regions. We discuss each of these
in turn.
SENSORY PROCESSING IN ASC
A number of studies have suggested atypical basic sensory pro-
cessing of social stimuli in ASC. Early imaging studies reported
that individuals with ASC exhibit hypoactivation, relative to con-
trol participants, of the FFA when viewing faces, suggesting that
abnormalities in this region may be related to atypical face pro-
cessing in ASC (Critchley et al., 2000; Schultz et al., 2000; Pierce
et al., 2001). A more recent study has shown that, when control
participants and individuals with ASC are cued with a fixation
cross to look at and attend to faces, FFA activity for individuals
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FIGURE 2 | Results from Cook and Bird (2011a). Control participants
primed with pro-social attitudes imitated significantly more than those primed
with non-social attitudes. However, this social modulation of imitation was
not observed for individuals with ASC: those primed with pro-social attitudes
imitated to the same extent as those primed with non-social attitudes.
“∗” indicates p < 0.05.
with ASC does not differ from that of age- and IQ- matched con-
trols (Hadjikhani et al., 2004). A similar trend can be observed
in the MNS literature whereby early studies suggested reduced
MNS activation (Oberman et al., 2005; Dapretto et al., 2006)
and corresponding imitation impairments (Avikainen et al., 2003;
Rogers et al., 2003; McIntosh et al., 2006) in ASC. However,
more recent imitation studies show that if individuals with ASC
are forced to look at the relevant features of an action, thereby
ensuring that they receive typical inputs about action kinemat-
ics, imitation is normalized (Bird et al., 2007; Press et al., 2010).
Recent studies therefore suggest that when input to perception
and action regions is controlled (e.g., by instructed direction
of eye-gaze) individuals with ASC exhibit typical responses in
sensory regions.
FUNCTION OF CONTROL REGIONS IN ASC
A number of studies have demonstrated that the mPFC and
TPJ are key areas in the control of imitation (Lhermitte, 1986;
Brass et al., 2001, 2005; Spengler et al., 2009, 2010b; Wang
et al., 2011b). It has recently been shown that atypical mPFC
activity during mentalising tasks is functionally associated with
atypical control over imitation in ASC (Spengler et al., 2010a;
see Figure 3). Spengler and colleagues’ study consisted of three
phases in which participants: (1) were scanned whilst watching
animations that evoked mentalising (Castelli et al., 2000); (2)
completed a behavioral measure of mentalising in which they had
to infer the mental states of story characters (Happé et al., 1999);
and (3) completed a behavioral measure of imitation-inhibition
that required them to inhibit imitating a video of finger actions
in order to make the required finger action. The ability to
inhibit the tendency to imitate was associated with reduced
behavioral mentalising scores and reduced social interaction
scores on an ASC diagnostic instrument (the Autism Diagnostic
Observation Schedule; Lord et al., 1989). Furthermore, mPFC
and TPJ activity during the fMRI mentalising task was corre-
lated with imitation-inhibition such that individuals with low
mPFC activity exhibited poor imitation-inhibition. Thus, men-
talising plays a role in imitation inhibition and atypical reg-
ulation of imitation in ASC may stem from aberrant mPFC
activation.
FUNCTIONAL CONNECTIVITY IN ASC
Recent functional connectivity MRI (fcMRI) studies have sug-
gested that functional connectivity between social brain regions
such as the mPFC and MNS is atypical in ASC. Intrinsic fcMRI
detects the temporal correlation between spatially discrete low-
frequency fluctuations of the BOLD signal. Shih et al. (2010)
used fcMRI to investigate the intrinsic connectivity of brain
areas associated with imitation and its control: the mPFC, IFG,
inferior parietal lobe (IPL) and STS. FMRI data were collected
while participants performed a non-imitative task (semantic deci-
sion/letter detection). The influence of PFC on MNS activity
was atypical in ASC (Figure 4). In individuals with ASC under
connectivity between frontal and posterior regions, during men-
talising, has also been reported (Castelli et al., 2002; Kana et al.,
2009).
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FIGURE 3 | Scatter plot showing the significant correlation in the ASC group between imitation-inhibition (interference score) and reaction times in
the mentalising task (ToM, Theory of Mind condition). Figure is reproduced, with permission, from Spengler et al. (2010a).
FIGURE 4 | Abnormal connectivity in the brain in ASC. Compared to
control participants individuals with ASC showed a significantly increased
effect of dPFC on IFG and reduced effect of IPL on IFG. STS, superior
temporal sulcus; IPL, inferior parietal lobule; IFG, inferior frontal gyrus;
dPFC, dorsal prefrontal cortex. Figure is reproduced, with permission, from
Shih et al. (2010).
SUMMARY
We suggest that atypical top-down modulation in ASC is due to
a deficit in at least one of the following areas: sensory regions;
control regions; and/or connectivity between control and sensory
regions. Although not the focus of the current paper one may
speculate that atypicalities in these areas could arise through both
genetic and experiential avenues. Let us take top-down modula-
tion of imitation as an example. As discussed above, top-down
signals from frontal to MNS regions are the likely neural cor-
relates of this phenomenon. Theoretically, atypical function of
these brain regions or connectivity between the regions could be
genetically predisposed or could be experientially acquired—if
individuals with ASC are not motivated to participate in social
situations (Chevallier et al., 2012), they will be less likely than
controls to acquire links between pro-social contextual cues and
elevated MNS activity. If these neural atypicalities are genetically
predisposed they should be invariant to training. Future studies,
which attempt to train top-down modulation in ASC, may shed
light on the aetiological basis of this deficit.
ATYPICAL TOP-DOWN MODULATION IN SCHIZOPHRENIA
Schizophrenia is characterized by positive symptoms (e.g., hal-
lucinations, delusions), negative symptoms (e.g., blunted affect,
anhedonia), lack of motivation (e.g., avolition, social isolation),
and cognitive impairments (e.g., working memory, attention). In
the social domain, individuals with schizophrenia often demon-
strate social awkwardness and difficulties in daily living (Penn
et al., 1997). It has been argued that social cognition deficits
represent a specific domain of impairment in this condition,
independent from classical cognitive deficits (Penn et al., 1997)
and that social impairments are highly resistant to medication
(Penn et al., 2008). As such, social deficits represent an important
domain of investigation in schizophrenia.
TOP-DOWN INFLUENCE OF ATTENTION IN SCHIZOPHRENIA
A number of studies have demonstrated reduced attentional
modulation of non-social stimuli in schizophrenia. Individuals
with schizophrenia exhibit impaired performance on oddball
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tasks, in which participants are required to respond to an infre-
quently presented target embedded in a stream of distractors
[see Cornblatt and Keilp (1994) for review]. For control partic-
ipants activity in PFC regions differentiates oddballs from non-
target stimuli (Kirino et al., 2000). Individuals with schizophrenia
show abnormal frontal activations during such tasks (Kiehl and
Liddle, 2001). Furthermore, individuals at high-risk of develop-
ing schizophrenia show significantly smaller differential frontal
activations between oddballs and non-target stimuli, suggesting
that prefrontal function begins to decline even before the onset of
illness (Morey et al., 2005).
Dichter et al. (2010) recently used a modified version of a
visual oddball fMRI task to investigate the influence of emo-
tion on selective attention in schizophrenia. Participants were
required to detect oddballs in a stream of distractors which
included aversive emotional scenes, requiring participants to
inhibit responses to the emotionally salient stimuli to achieve
optimal task performance. Compared with controls, individuals
with schizophrenia showed smaller differential frontal activations
for oddballs and non-target stimuli. In addition, for oddballs rel-
ative to non-targets, controls deactivated limbic regions including
the amygdala, whereas individuals with schizophrenia did not.
Thus compared to individuals with schizophrenia, control par-
ticipants were better able to inhibit their emotional reactions to
aversive scenes. Dichter and colleagues also found that activation
of frontal regions to the aversive stimuli was negatively correlated
with avolition and anhedonia as measured by the Scale for the
Assessment of Negative Symptoms (SANS, Andreasen, 1983). No
correlations were found between BOLD response and positive
symptoms as measured by the Scale for the Assessment of Positive
Symptoms (SAPS, Andreasen, 1984). Suggesting that atypical
frontal activations to aversive emotional stimuli may, in particular,
be associated with the negative features of schizophrenia.
Although the work of Dichter and colleagues hints at atypical
top-down attentional modulation in schizophrenia further work
is necessary both to replicate this initial finding and to investi-
gate more directly the influence of attention on the processing of
social stimuli. Future work might employ a paradigm like that
used by Bird et al. (2006) to investigate attentional modulation of
face processing.
PRIOR EXPECTATIONS IN SCHIZOPHRENIA
Schizophrenia has been linked to an increased influence of prior
expectations on sensory perception (Aleman et al., 2003). We
recently compared the influence of prior expectations on facial
expression discrimination in control participants and patients
with schizophrenia (Barbalat et al., 2012b). Using the paradigm
described above (Barbalat et al., 2012a), we found that, rela-
tive to controls, participants with schizophrenia were slower to
identify a fearful face when instructed to look for an angry
face and were less accurate to identify an angry face in a fear-
ful context. Hence the incongruent prior expectation interfered
more with the processing of incoming sensory data for indi-
viduals with schizophrenia than for controls. Such an increased
influence of prior expectations in patients was not observed for
happy faces, suggesting a specific over-weighting of prior expec-
tations of negative emotions in schizophrenia. It has previously
been suggested that over-reliance on prior expectations of nega-
tive emotions might specifically underlie delusions of persecution
(Blackwood et al., 2001). In support of this, we found that patients
with paranoid delusions were more biased by expectations of
threat than patients who were not currently experiencing para-
noid delusions. These results are in line with previous reports
that a probabilistic reasoning impairment in schizophrenia is
more prominent for salient stimuli such as threatening emotions
(Blackwood et al., 2001).
A further example, of an atypical influence of prior expec-
tations in schizophrenia, is illustrated in belief inflexibility
(Woodward et al., 2008). Belief inflexibility is a thinking style in
which patients show an unwillingness to modify their beliefs even
when confronted with disconfirmatory evidence. In one demon-
stration of belief inflexibility participants were presented with an
initial statement (e.g., “Heike is very thin”) and asked to rate
the probability that each of four possible explanations was true.
These possible explanations ranged in the extent to which they
were likely to be true [e.g., “Heike is homeless” (true), “Heike
is a model” (lure), “Heike is suffering from an eating disorder”
(lure), “Heike has lost her false teeth” (absurd)]. Following these
initial ratings participants were presented with a second state-
ment (e.g., “Heike has had a hard life”) and asked if they would
like to revise their original ratings. Finally participants were pre-
sented with a third statement (e.g., “Heike does not even have
a home”) and again asked if they would like to revise their rat-
ings. For beliefs that were initially held strongly, patients with
schizophrenia were less likely than control participants to revise
their belief after the additional statements. It has been proposed
that this maintenance of false beliefs in the face of disconfirma-
tory evidence may be related to patients giving too much weight
to priors as compared to incoming sensory evidence (Moritz and
Woodward, 2006; Woodward et al., 2006, 2008).
A growing body of evidence suggests atypical top-down influ-
ences of priming in schizophrenia. Ilankovic et al. (2011) asked
participants, with and without paranoid schizophrenia, to lis-
ten to either self-produced or other-produced speech, which was
either preceded by a photo of the participant or of the other
speaker. On “valid” trials the participant viewed a photograph of
the true speaker, whereas on “invalid” trials the photograph did
not depict the speaker (e.g., the photo of the other was followed
by self-produced speech). On each trial participants were required
to judge whether speech was self-produced or other-produced.
Individuals with paranoid schizophrenia made more errors in
the invalid condition compared to control participants, suggest-
ing that they were more susceptible to the top-down priming
influence of the photograph. In the schizophrenia group delu-
sion scores (as measured by the psychotic symptom rating scale
PSYRATS; Haddock et al., 1999) were positively correlated with
errors on invalid trials in which participants listened to their dis-
torted voice preceded by the face of the other. Thus suggesting
that an over-reliance on primes might be particularly strongly
associated with delusions in schizophrenia.
Evidence from affective priming studies also suggests atypi-
cally strong priming effects in schizophrenia (Höschel and Irle,
2001; Suslow et al., 2003). Following subliminally presented neg-
ative facial expression primes individuals with schizophrenia were
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more likely than controls to judge neutral faces and objects as
unpleasant. Similarly, following the viewing of negative scenes,
compared to control participants, individuals with schizophre-
nia were more likely to rate faces as untrustworthy (Hooker et al.,
2011). This body of evidence therefore suggests an abnormally
strong influence of top-down negative primes on social stimulus
processing.
NEURAL BASIS OF ATYPICAL TOP-DOWN MODULATION
IN SCHIZOPHRENIA
Prominent theories of top-down cognitive biases in schizophrenia
suggest abnormal integration of new evidence into prior expec-
tations (Blackwood et al., 2001; Moritz and Woodward, 2006;
Freeman, 2007) driven by an over-weighting of the prior expec-
tation as compared to incoming sensory evidence (Fletcher and
Frith, 2009; Stephan et al., 2009). Such an imbalance between
prior expectations and new sensory evidence would result in
the discounting of disconfirmatory evidence that runs counter
to prior beliefs (Moritz and Woodward, 2006; Woodward et al.,
2006, 2007). An imbalance between prior expectations and new
sensory evidence could be the result of: atypical sensory process-
ing; atypical processing of prior beliefs; and atypical connectivity
between regions associated with sensory processing and prior
beliefs. We will discuss each in turn.
SENSORY PROCESSING IN SCHIZOPHRENIA
A recent study of auditory processing in schizophrenia suggests
evidence of dysfunction in the earliest afferent input to the pri-
mary auditory cortex, which arrives from subcortical regions, in
patients with schizophrenia (Leavitt et al., 2007). Similar find-
ings have been reported with respect to visual processing (e.g.,
emotional face processing; Gur et al., 2002; Michalopoulou et al.,
2008). These findings suggest atypicalities in “bottom-up” sen-
sory processing. However, as can be seen in the ASC literature,
supposedly “bottom-up” deficits can be the result of atypical eye-
gaze patterns or atypical attentional modulation of neural activity.
Indeed, individuals with schizophrenia tend to avoid looking at
salient regions of the face such as the eyes and mouth and this
restricted visual scan path is associated with poorer emotion
recognition accuracy (Loughland et al., 2002). Further studies are
required to investigate sensory processing, in schizophrenia, in
the context of visual scan paths to elucidate whether atypical func-
tion of sensory regions can truly be considered a “bottom-up”
deficit.
PRIOR BELIEFS IN SCHIZOPHRENIA
Detecting when something in the environment violates expec-
tations is important, particularly with respect to controlling
behaviors such as the direction of eye gaze to sources of new
information. In typical control individuals the right PFC has
been associated with employing prediction error signals for action
selection, which denote the extent to which an incoming sen-
sory stimulus violates expectations (Fletcher et al., 2001; Corlett
et al., 2004; Turner et al., 2004; Corlett et al., 2006). In individ-
uals with schizophrenia this region functions atypically (Corlett
et al., 2007) and it has been suggested that disruptions in the
dopamine and glutamate systems in schizophrenia might result
in inaccurate and noisy prediction errors (Corlett et al., 2009;
Fletcher and Frith, 2009; Corlett et al., 2011). Although specula-
tive, at present it is possible that these abnormal prediction errors
relate to the overly strong effects of priming and expectations dis-
cussed above. For instance an inaccurate and noisy representation
of the difference between expected and actual events may mean
that large violations of expectations are under-weighted and have
little influence on learning, and hence abnormally strong pri-
ors could prevail (Fletcher and Frith, 2009). To investigate this
possibility future studies may employ computational modeling
combined with paradigms such as the one we recently employed
(Barbalat et al., 2012b) to investigate the role of prediction errors
in top-down modulation of social processing. One prediction,
based on our previous finding (Barbalat et al., 2012b), is that
prediction errors relating to the detection of fearful faces when
angry faces are expected would be more noisy for individuals with
schizophrenia compared with controls. The noisiness of predic-
tion errors may be hypothesized to be correlated with reaction
times such that those individuals with the noisiest prediction
errors are the slowest to respond to fearful faces in an anger
context.
FUNCTIONAL CONNECTIVITY BETWEEN REGIONS ASSOCIATED
WITH SENSORY PROCESSING AND PRIOR BELIEFS
IN SCHIZOPHRENIA
Recent computational models of perception and learning suggest
there may be a hierarchy of prediction error driven inferenc-
ing devices where lower levels of the hierarchy relate to per-
ception and upper levels are more relevant to beliefs (Friston,
2005; Fletcher and Frith, 2009). Communicating between lev-
els of the hierarchy is important in enabling the updating of
behavior according to violations of expectations. Studies using
predominately non-social stimuli have led to the suggestion
that schizophrenia may be associated with reduced connectiv-
ity between brain regions (Friston and Frith, 1995). This theory
raises the possibility that schizophrenia is characterized by a lack
of communication between different levels of the inferencing
hierarchy.
Some researchers have found evidence for this with respect
to social stimuli. Ford et al. (2002) investigated event-related
electroencephalogram (EEG) coherence whilst participants talked
aloud and listened to their own speech while remaining silent.
For typical control participants talking, compared to passive lis-
tening, elicited greater coherence between frontal and temporal
regions, whereas individuals with schizophrenia showed reduced
fronto-temporal connectivity during talking (Figure 5).
CONCLUSION
This paper has discussed evidence that top-down modulation of
social perception and imitation is atypical in ASC and schizophre-
nia. Given the importance of our perception of, and reactions
to, others in our daily lives, atypicalities in these abilities may be
related to key features of both ASC and schizophrenia.
We have reviewed evidence that both attention and prior
expectations modulate social perception in healthy subjects,
which might rely on top-down signals from the lateral and the
mPFC. In schizophrenia, this top-down modulation of social
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FIGURE 5 | Abnormal connectivity in the brain in schizophrenia.
Lateral views of the left hemisphere of the brain. The red lines connect
areas that exhibited greater frontotemporal electroencephalogram
coherence during talking than during listening for normal controls and
patients with schizophrenia. The thickness of the line indicates the
probability level for the t-tests that compared the findings. The thicker the
line, the larger the difference between the two coherences. In the
controls, coherence during talking was greater than during listening for all
20 of the electrode pairs. In the patients, coherences during talking were
greater for only two of the pairs (one in each hemisphere). NS, not
significant. Data from Ford et al. (2002). Figure and caption is reproduced,
with permission from Fletcher and Frith (2009).
perception is abnormal in that patients demonstrate atypi-
cally strong influences of expectations. For individuals with
ASC the opposite appears to be true: where schizophrenia is
characterized by abnormally strong influences of prior expec-
tations ASC is characterized by abnormally weak top-down
modulation.
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